the developing world rightly focus on lowering the cost of health products, while preserving the financial incentive for innovation. 4 The high cost of many medicines is largely due to the international patent system, codified by the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which grants a monopoly to the innovator and allows it to completely control pricing for a period of years. The result is an access gap, whereby patients in low-and middle-income countries (LMI) cannot afford expensive patented drugs, while patients in wealthy countries can afford and do have access to such treatments. In response to this, the most explored means for lowering drug prices thus far has been the introduction of generic competition in the drug market, whether accomplished through licensing provisions or through public pressure on pharmaceutical companies. 5 An access gap also exists, however, with respect to medical and preventative technologies, so that persons in developing countries are at higher risk of acquiring certain diseases, such as cervical cancer, that can be prevented by regular screenings or vaccination. 6 Generic production of some of these technologies, particularly biologics such as vaccines, is not always possible, and thus finding solutions to this access gap can be difficult. Advocating for generic competition to service developing country markets has been one successful way of dealing with lack of access to drugs, but may not be the best approach to facilitating affordable access to biologics and devices. As such, advocates seeking to bridge the access gap have had to look at all available options for doing so, and have looked to university licensing as one viable solution for enhancing access to drugs, biologics, devices, and other health products. 
THE GLOBAL HEALTH LICENSING PROGRAM 283 UNIVERSITIES' ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ACCESS GAP
Since the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities and government agencies to patent and capitalize on their own research, universities have played a central role in the development of health products under our current system. 8 Universities now own significant intellectual property rights that are licensed to pharmaceutical and biotech companies and are developed into lifesaving health innovations. This influential role continues to increase, as the number of patents filed and licensing agreements signed by universities nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003. 9 Universities also have a unique duty. They do not have a profit motive, but rather have missions to educate and conduct research to enhance the global good. Universities have a distinctive obligation to use their role in the development and licensing of health technologies to further global health and narrow the gap between rich and poor. Many research universities are at a turning point, making the transition from national to truly global universities, and addressing today's global health inequalities is a key part of this transition.
10
Universities' role in promoting global health has been comprehensively addressed elsewhere, particularly by the advocacy organization Universities Allied for Essential Medicines.
11
Practical approaches to university humanitarian licensing have most recently been proposed by technology transfer experts April Effort and Ashley Stevens of Boston University. 12 This article seeks to build on and synthesize their excellent work into a practical program that can harness the unique position and mission of universities in health research.
I. OVERVIEW
Various approaches have been proposed to maximize universities' role in enhancing access to medicines for the global poor. Academics, practitioners, and activists have, at different times, proposed non-assertion agreements, reservation of rights provisions, white knight provisions, patent pools, opensource licensing, sublicensing requirements, the Equitable Access License, atcost pricing, milestones, non-exclusive licenses, restrictions on patenting of future innovations, and public-private partnerships. As discussed below, however, it is apparent from the application of these approaches, from the experiences of public-private partnerships seeking to facilitate access, and from our experience working with a university to implement a comprehensive humanitarian licensing program, that there are pros and cons to each of these techniques. No single approach will meet the needs of every negotiating partner or every type of licensed intellectual property, and there is no silver bullet to bridge the access gap.
Therefore, we propose a comprehensive approach to humanitarian licensing for universities -a Global Health Licensing Program. It would have two formal components: a committee to review innovations ready for licensing and a toolbox of access licensing options for technology transfer offices to use during licensing negotiations. Our program incorporates a transparent procedure for licensing innovations with developing country potential, while simultaneously meeting standards identified in the leading technology licensing literature.
13 To be as effective as possible, such a program should have an articulated mission statement, involve all relevant stakeholders, utilize all available licensing approaches, and be a formal, standing component of the technology transfer office.
The next Part of this article will discuss the current options universities could use to enhance access to medicines, either alone or working in partnership. It will then address why each of these options alone is not a sufficient solution, and why each one's effectiveness will vary by health technology, university position in the licensing negotiation, and other variables. The final Part of the article will outline the program and process we propose and the standards that should be utilized.
II. CURRENT OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING ACCESS TO MEDICINES
VIA UNIVERSITY LICENSING To date, a variety of approaches have been devised and recommended for universities seeking to license intellectual property and the fruits of university research in a humanitarian way. We argue in this article that none of these offers a one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing access to essential medicines through university licensing. That said, these approaches could be utilized in tandem, or, as we propose in Part III, as part of a comprehensive approach to humanitarian licensing, in which the most appropriate and effective licensing strategy for each innovation is selected from a toolbox of options held by the university.
In this Part, we lay out the landscape and summarize the humanitarian licensing strategies proposed to date, providing a short -and by no means comprehensive -analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. Wherever possible, we present sample language for these strategies to demonstrate how they have been used in practice. Then we provide a simple chart that illustrates graphically how each of these strategies can be employed. The idea is that a truly comprehensive approach to socially responsible licensing would utilize each of these strategies, or a combination of these strategies, when they are appropriate for the innovation being licensed. A university seeking to take such a comprehensive approach would collect information and samples of all these options, as part of their toolbox of approaches. They would then select from this toolbox the most appropriate option for innovations that could have significant potential in low-and middle-income countries.
At the outset of this Part, it must be noted that a variety of terms are used in the access debate, often to describe the same approach. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather a summary of the approaches we found in our research. We adopt the terms that seemed most widely utilized and group them together based on similarity of underlying approach. Another caveat is that many of these approaches cannot be neatly categorized, as they incorporate some of the same elements. Thus, we recognize that our categorization is somewhat artificial and that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. To aid universities seeking to implement a humanitarian licensing program that makes use of all available approaches, however, we felt it would make the task less arduous to group similar methods together for purposes of explaining the approaches.
A. Approaches Utilizing Market Segmentation
Many recommended strategies take an approach that is based on market segmentation. The overall idea is to segment markets essentially by a country's income level, and then give licenses for specific markets only. Alternatively, a licensee's responsibilities could change based on which market it is serving. Non-exclusive licensing often implicates this approach: a licensee has exclusive rights to market and sell a technology resulting from university research in high-income countries, but does not have exclusive rights in lowto middle-income countries. As such, generic competitors could also obtain a license to operate in these developing markets, reducing costs and increasing access to medicines, while still allowing the original licensee exclusive rights in the lucrative developed-world markets. We found three types of licensing strategies that utilize this type of approach:
Non-Assertion of Rights Agreements
These agreements "grant permission to third parties to practice a patent they would otherwise infringe." 14 A non-assert agreement is an implied license. The patent-holder agrees not to prosecute infringement of the patent by a certain organization or agrees not to produce drugs/vaccines for a specified developing country market. Under this approach, a university would prevent its primary licensee from prosecuting infringement in certain markets (which would have to be identified at the outset). These non-assert agreements can come in three forms: (1) a bilateral agreement between a primary licensee and a company seeking to serve the developing world (or a university and a primary licensee), or (2) a multilateral agreement between many interested parties, or (3) simply by proclamation of the patent holding university.
15
One of the main benefits of a non-assert agreement is that it is selfexecuting, and a university does not have to expend significant time or effort drafting multiple licenses for a given innovation. Another benefit is that a non-assert can be used to facilitate both generic drug and vaccine manufacture in developing countries, if the non-assert is related to certain processes or manufacturing "know-how."
16 There are also some drawbacks to using non-asserts, however. For example, the university has to use very specific language and carefully identify which rights will not be enforced and determine whether any field of use restrictions will apply. 17 It may have a difficult time utilizing a non-assert when the licensed innovation is early stage research, requiring significant downstream innovation. In such an instance, the university would have to include further language ensuring access to, or non-assertion of rights in, downstream innovations, which could require more bargaining power than a typical university would have. Additionally, a nonassert agreement may not effectively allow generic manufacturers to make a drug/biologic if the university owns only some of the intellectual property needed to produce the drug/biologic. For instance, while the university may own the patent to the key protein used in a vaccine, if another entity has patented the production process or other elements required to produce the vaccine, the non-assert alone will not be effective.
Boston University has drafted some model non-assert language that could be used in university licensing agreements. This is excerpted in the box on the following page. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has also drafted a non-assert proclamation, which is excerpted in the box following Boston University's model non-assert language:
Id.
16
17
Non-Assertion of Rights Agreements: Examples
Boston University Non-Assert License
Include in the "WHEREAS" clauses:
WHEREAS, University and Licensee acknowledge that it may serve the public good to make certain drugs available at affordable prices to Non-Market Countries in certain circumstances, with appropriate safeguards to Licensee's economic interests in other markets.
Include in the "Definitions":
Market Countries shall mean: a. 
Reservation of Rights Agreements
A similar approach based on market segmentation is a reservation of rights agreement, in which the university would reserve the rights to its intellectual property, except in the ways in which it explicitly licenses certain rights to a primary licensee. The university would license the rights to an innovation to a licensee, but would designate exactly how or where such rights could be used. All other use of the rights would remain with the university. Universities have used this strategy in many licensing agreements in the past to reserve the rights to improve upon an innovation through further research. The mechanism could be used for humanitarian licensing as well.
18 For instance, the university could segment markets and then grant the licensee the right to develop, market, and distribute a technology only in high-income countries. Then the university could reserve the rights to license to another 18 Alan B. Bennett, Reservation of Rights for Humanitarian Uses, in Handbook of Best Practices, supra note 13, at 41-43.
Non-Assertion of Rights Agreements: Examples

MIT Biomedical Non-Assert Proclamation/Multi-Lateral Agreement
In order to facilitate widespread distribution of an important class of research reagents, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the [Max Planck Society], The Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, and The University of Massachusetts ("the Patent Owners") now announce that they will not assert the patents listed below against companies that sell or use DNA vectors which induce production of siRNA endogenously, provided that such vectors are only used for research purposes, and provided that the RNA that mediates RNA interference is not isolated from the transformed cells.
The Patent Owners intend to enforce the patents listed below against any use not specifically listed above. Id.
Reservation of Rights Agreements: Examples
Mark Anderson, Technology Law Solicitor
Retention of rights by [University].
If [University Name] considers that the Licensee is failing to ensure the supply of Licensed Products to customers in any At-Cost market at a Cost-Based Price, it may so notify the Licensee, whereupon the Parties shall promptly meet (and in any event within 30 days of the date of such notification) to discuss the situation in good faith. If after any such meeting [University Name] acting in good faith continue to consider that the Licensee has so failed, it may so notify the Licensee, specifying the Licensed products and the At-Cost markets where such failure has occurred (the 'Specified Products and Markets'), whereupon [University Name] shall automatically have a non-exclusive, payment-free license from the Licensee, with the right to grant sub-license(s), to research, develop, and manufacture [Licensed Products] anywhere in the world for the purpose of supplying the Specified Products and Markets, and to import, distribute, and supply such Licensed Products in and to such At-Cost markets. 
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Another example of a university reservation of rights agreement is excerpted below:
White Knight Provisions
Another strategy based on market segmentation is the use of "White Knight" provisions in a license, which require the licensee to perform certain tasks for the public good or humanitarian purposes in exchange for a license to utilize a technology developed with public funds. 22 Requirements can include marketing a resultant product at a lower price in developing 
Reservation of Rights Agreement: Examples
University of California-Davis countries, donating or providing clinical trial data to other licensees given a license to produce a drug specifically for humanitarian purposes, and other provisions. 23 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) licenses include White Knight provisions, and the advantage of these licensing terms is that they are very explicit, such that the obligations of the licensee are clear and unambiguous. The NIH also requires a global marketing strategy to ensure that the licensee markets and distributes the product outside high-income countries. 24 However, universities may not have the bargaining power that the NIH does, or may be too far upstream in the process to even know what to demand or require of a licensee if a product has yet to even be developed. At the same time, once a university innovation is available for licensing, its potential is generally well known -for example, that it could be used to develop a cardiac drug or a specific vaccine -so that White Knight provisions could be inserted in university licensing agreements.
An example of the White Knight provisions utilized by NIH is included below and could potentially provide a model for universities seeking to add White Knight requirements to their licenses:
23
See Brewster et al., supra note 22, at 211.
24
See Stevens, supra note 22, at 97; see also Rorbaugh, supra note 22.
White Knight Provisions: Example National Institutes of Health
Within six (6) months of New Drug Application/Biologic License Application approval in the United States or its equivalent in Europe, Licensee shall send a written report to the Public Health Service detailing the potential Public Sector market to fulfill the public health need for the approved drug or vaccine in Developing Countries, including the impact of any approved competing drug or vaccine.
The report shall also include Licensee's proposed amendment to the Commercial Development Plan, Appendix E [not included here], and the Benchmarks and Performance, Appendix D [not included here] to address the needs for Licensed Products in Developing Countries.
Licensee will diligently consider if it is possible from a commercial and technical point of view, to satisfy said potential Public Sector market, either directly with Licensee's own resources and/or through joint ventures with third parties. Acceptance of this report and amendment is required by PHS in writing; such acceptance will not be unreasonably denied.
"Public Sector" means the government of a Developing Country, or any entity empowered by the government of a Developing Country to act for said government in matters applicable to this Agreement, organizations within the United Nations system including the World Health Global Organization and UNICEF, and other nonprofit agencies which may purchase drugs or vaccines for delivery, manufacture and/or sale in Developing Countries.
"Developing Country" means countries eligible for support from the Global Fund for Children's Vaccines (GAVI) or success or organization, which at the effective date of this Agreement are those countries with a Gross National Product of less than US $1,000 per capita per year, and at the effective date of this Agreement include the countries listed in Appendix G [not included here]. There are some key elements required in crafting agreements utilizing any market-segmentation based approach. As evidenced in the model Boston University licensing language, defining the different markets is essential. Additionally, agreements must clearly define terms such as "developing country" or "low-income country" so that it is clear what metric is used to determine if a country falls within a non-exclusive market. 25 Listing the countries where rights will not be enforced, as in the Boston University license, may be preferable. Finally, most of these agreements -except for proclamation non-assert agreements -require high levels of specificity with respect to the parameters of the license in order to ensure effectiveness. This can be difficult for universities, which are often licensing the results of initial research, early in the process of drug development.
B. Approaches that Facilitate Generic Competition
Other humanitarian licensing strategies rely on facilitating generic competition to serve underserved markets. These strategies reflect the belief that generic competition is the only way to truly reduce prices for patients and enhance accessibility to drugs in low-and middle-income countries. 26 The strategies proposed all attempt to give generic producers, both in high-income and low-income countries, the ability to fully produce and market a drug for low-and middle-income countries while preventing the cheaper drugs from infiltrating high-income markets and undercutting the profits of the primary licensee.
Patent Pools
A popular theory for facilitating generic competition and improving access is the use of patent pools -voluntary agreements entered into by two or more patent owners, in which the patent owners agree to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties. 27 A patent pool can give a licensee (for instance, a third-party generic manufacturer) all the requisite patents to develop a drug without infringing on anyone's patent. Royalties from the license are then distributed via the pool to all the patent owners in a predetermined manner.
28 Patent pools also avoid patent "thickets," where so many different entities own patents related to a drug that a third party cannot navigate the patent landscape in the requisite way to produce the drug, or where one patent holder can hold up the entire attempt to generically manufacture the drug. Another benefit of patent pools is that they lower transaction costs in that a third party seeking a license to produce a drug does not have to go to all patent holders individually. 29 THE GLOBAL HEALTH LICENSING PROGRAM 293 generic producer to obtain patents on know-how or processes necessary to produce a drug or vaccine, so that the generic producer does not have to reinvent the wheel and discover the process on its own. 30 Finally, proponents argue that patent pools can enhance innovation by making it easier for third parties to conduct research to improve upon an existing product or tailor it for a specific market.
31
Patent pools vary in complexity but often involve cross-licensing by the patent holders as well as a central entity that licenses out these rights to a third party and collects/distributes royalties. The licenses may only allow the third party to make and distribute the generic product in specified countries or markets and often require that the third party grant back to the pool any rights obtained to improvements the third party makes on the health product. Universities could enter into patent pools with other universities, or license their innovations to an already existing pool, to facilitate access.
While patent pools have many advantages, they also have some drawbacks. Specifically, they require significant administration as well as consent from all patent holders in order to work.
32 Additionally, to be effective, the pool may need to obtain rights related to know-how and trade secrets that a patent holder may not be willing to cross-license or make available. There is some evidence that pools may present antitrust problems, though the Department of Justice has issued regulations noting that such antitrust issues can be prevented if certain requirements are met. 33 Nevertheless, support for patent pools as a means of enhancing access appears to be growing in the advocacy community. Patent pools may represent a novel way for universities to collectively facilitate access to products developed with university research, reducing fears held by many technology transfer offices that a university acting alone will face isolation or retribution from industry partners.
Examples of two patent pool licenses are given below. The first is from CAMBIA, a non-profit institute that creates innovations and tools that enable developing countries to manage their own health challenges. CAMBIA has created BiOS, an initiative for biological open-source licensing, which uses a BiOS open-source, patent-pool license to facilitate access to health-related technologies.
34 BiOS has created a mutual non-assertion agreement as well as a health technologies agreement, both of which are available on the BiOS website. 35 A portion of the BiOS health technologies agreement is excerpted below.
Knowledge Ecology International, a non-profit group that seeks better outcomes and management of knowledge resources, created the other example. KEI has formed the non-profit EMILA, the Essential Medical Inventions Licensing Agency, a Swiss organization that manages patent pools or licensing programs that increase access to patented medical products and 36 EMILA has drafted three model agreements: an "in-license" which cross-licenses intellectual property among patent holders, an "out-license" which licenses the pooled patents to third parties, and an authorization allowing third parties to rely upon health registration data when trying to register their generic versions of a medical product or vaccine. A portion of the "in-license" is given below; the rest of the license and the other model agreements are available from KEI/EMILA. 
Licensed Patents
Licensed Patents licensed pursuant to this License Agreement are delimited in Appendix A hereto.
Retention of Rights
Licensor retains all of its rights, title, and interests to its world-wide Patents for use throughout countries not identified as Licensed Countries hereunder, and non-exclusive rights to practice and license Licensed Patents as it sees fit, in its sole discretion, throughout Licensed Countries.
Non-exclusive sub-licensing
Subject to the terms of this License Agreement, EMILA is authorized to grant nonexclusive licenses to Qualified Sub-licensees for the manufacture, registration, import, export, distribution, offer for sale, sale and/or use of Product and implementation of any Process in Licensed Countries.
Product Differentiation
Product shall be differentiated from Licensor's by special packaging and labeling. 
No Use of Licensor's Marks
Labeling
Sub-licensees will include the following notice, translated into relevant languages as appropriate, on all labeling: "Manufactured and sold under license from the Essential Medical Inventions Licensing Agency. Not permitted for sale or use outside the territory in which license has been granted."
Back-licensing of Improvements
Any patented Improvements shall be treated as Licensed Patents, and they will be subject to terms equal to those secured under this License Agreement. (to a generic manufacturer) the right to produce a drug/health innovation in low-and middle-income countries only. It is imperative that the university draft the sub-license terms and include them in the original license to ensure that the corporate partner does not use its ability to sub-license for nonhumanitarian purposes or to undermine such purposes.
39 Then, the university can specify the obligations of the corporate partner, when the corporate partner can sub-license, what must be sub-licensed (such as data and manufacturing expertise), and to whom a corporate partner may sub-license.
An advantage of this use of sub-licenses or non-exclusive licensing is that it may be a viable option for universities licensing technology related to vaccines and biologics. Many of the "generic competition" strategies listed thus far may not be viable options for licensing biologics or vaccines because these are difficult -if not impossible with current science -for a generic producer to reverse-engineer and manufacture. Drugs, by contrast, can usually be broken down and reverse-engineered by a generic producer to determine exactly the chemical formula involved. Then, the generic producer can use that chemical formula to re-create the drug and distribute it. Vaccines and biologics, however, are much more complicated to reverse-engineer and often rely on components that cannot be easily re-created without specific laboratory and manufacturing capabilities. For example, the HPV vaccine is based on a specific L1 protein, which would have to be grown in large quantities in a competent lab, in order to mass produce the vaccine. 40 Thus, use of sub-licenses or non-exclusive sub-licenses may allow the generic producer to maintain data, know-how, and manufacturing expertise from the original licensee, so that it could adequately produce a generic biologic or vaccine.
A downside of this strategy is that it requires careful attention to detail and expertise in drafting the original license to include the sub-licensing terms. If the university research being licensed is extremely upstream in the drug/biologic development process, it may be difficult for a university to specify the sub-license terms.
The Equitable Access License (EAL)
Another strategy based on facilitating generic competition is the Equitable Access License, or EAL, developed by Universities Allied for Essential Medicines. 41 The EAL utilizes a combination of cross-licensing and grant-back of rights to enable generic competition. Basically, a university licenses the rights to a health innovation to a first licensee, which then grants back to the university any exclusive rights it has in the end product. 42 The university then has all the rights necessary to make the end product, and can grant licenses directly to generic manufacturers to produce a drug solely for low-and middle-income markets. 43 In return for the license, the generic THE GLOBAL HEALTH LICENSING PROGRAM 297 manufacturer must pay royalties to the first licensee and to the university. Royalties would generally be determined on a sliding scale based on the wealth level of each low-and middle-income country where the generic manufacturer sells the drug (commonly between two and five percent of net sales).
44
The EAL has some significant benefits. First, it does not require the university to police the first licensee or take action to ensure that the first licensee meets its obligations under any humanitarian clauses included in the license -a potential drawback of many socially responsible licensing approaches. 45 Additionally, the EAL is structured so that it is somewhat selfexecuting: the university does not even need to draw up specific licenses for each generic producer that wants to make the end product for low-and middle-income markets. 46 The generic producer simply invokes the EAL by notifying the university and the first licensee. That producer can then automatically begin manufacturing the end product (provided it abides by certain requirements, like, for example, only producing the drug for aforementioned markets, differentiating the product from brand-name versions, ensuring no penetration of the generic drug into high-income markets).
However, the EAL has been called "utopian" and has engendered some valid criticism. 47 Some commentators recommend adding a term limit to the EAL, so that it only runs for the length of the patent, generic producers are not required to continue paying royalties after the patent expires, and the EAL is enforceable in countries where perpetual licenses are outlawed (for example, Japan and Belgium). 48 Many commentators have noted that the EAL might discourage corporate industry partners from engaging in licensing with universities.
49 First, the small royalty the industry partner would receive from generic producers may not provide enough of an incentive for the industry partner to agree to grant all its rights in the end product and know-how to the university. 50 Second, because the EAL does not include a remedy if the generic producer violates the license terms and sells its generic product in highincome markets, some argue that industry partners will not agree to its terms. 51 Third, the EAL allows a generic producer anywhere to invoke the license and produce a drug for developing country markets. As a result, a direct competitor of the first licensee (a drug company located in a highincome market, for example) could invoke the EAL and obtain access to all the know-how and manufacturing expertise needed to make a health product.
52 Lastly, the EAL may place a burden on university technology transfer offices in that they need to manage all the exchanges of confidential know-how and expertise, and it has been argued that the royalty requirement 44 Id.
45
46
47
See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 27; Stevens, supra note 22; Effort & Stevens, supra note 13.
48
See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 27, at 298-99.
49
See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 27.
50
See Stevens, supra note 22, at 981.
51
See Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 27, at 301.
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is not in keeping with the university mission (i.e. universities should only recoup royalties on innovations from sales in high-income markets). 
C. Pricing Approaches
At-Cost Pricing
Other strategies for socially responsible licensing are based on differential pricing of resultant drugs and biologics for different markets. Almost all strategies using a pricing approach involve at-cost pricing -the idea that a drug or biologic should be priced in low-and middle-income countries at cost of production or cost of production plus a moderate markup. 54 A university would include terms in its license to an industry partner that requires the licensee to make the resultant product available in low-and middle-income countries at-cost, or at a specified markup. Since it is difficult at the outset to have an idea of an adequate price, as it is not yet possible to determine cost of production, the university would also include clauses that require the licensee to submit regular reports on manufacturing costs and product cost calculation details, so that the university could devise a fair at-cost price.
55
While many people laud at-cost pricing as the easiest option for university technology transfer offices, to be effective, this approach would actually require considerable effort on the part of the university and may be more difficult than it seems. First, the inclusion of at-cost pricing language in a license issued at an early stage in the drug development process can deter investment in product development. If a drug company knows from the terms of the license that it will not be able to make a significant profit in certain markets, it may not have an incentive to contract with a university for the rights to the innovation or, worse, may choose not to invest in further research and development of a drug post-licensing. Second, for an at-cost pricing arrangement to be effective, both the university and the first licensee have to know the details of the production, marketing, and distribution costs of a given drug -and the university will have to continuously request such information from the licensee or else have it in advance of licensing, which is unlikely. 56 Third, a clear framework for calculating the price for poor countries, and a list of specified countries where this price is required, are needed at the outset and must be included in the license for the scheme to be effective. 57 Otherwise, universities may be apt to include a vague clause merely stating that the resultant product must be made available in poor countries at a fair or reasonable price, leading to arguments with the licensee over what the term fair or reasonable price requires.
58 Finally, at-cost pricing approaches are almost impossible to use for licensing of technology related to vaccines, as many governments or non-profit organizations, such as UNICEF, will eventually bargain for low prices in return for bulk purchases. As such, it is impossible for a university to know in advance what a government or non- 
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profit would find reasonable or be able to pay, and mandating a given price for the resultant vaccine could negatively impact future negotiations between these entities and the licensee.
59
D. Other approaches
As noted above, many of the humanitarian licensing strategies proposed thus far do not lend themselves easily to categorization. This section serves as a "catch-all," including the rest of the approaches we found widely advocated but which did not fall into any of the aforementioned categories.
Performance Milestones
One interesting strategy involves the use of contractual performance milestones that are included up-front in an exclusive license.
60 These provisions require the licensee to meet certain humanitarian milestones, or else the university can take certain actions -terminate the license, license the technology to someone else to meet the humanitarian goals, or fine the licensee. Examples of milestones that universities could require a licensee to meet include delivery to a certain percentage of the developing world by a certain date, meeting a certain sales volume in low-and middle-income markets, or penetration of public markets to a specified extent.
61
Using milestones in licensing has a lot of benefits. Milestones clearly articulate a licensee's responsibilities in marketing and distributing a product developed using university research.
62 Additionally, this strategy establishes the goals of a license at the outset, and demonstrates that humanitarian purposes are an important goal of the license. Plus, it allows a university to negotiate an exclusive license -which is more attractive to industry -but gives the university a way out if the licensee does not market/distribute the product in a way that is in keeping with the humanitarian goals of the license or the university.
However, using milestones can be difficult because they require great specificity in licensing terms. 63 Including a vague statement akin to existing due diligence clauses, even if done on purpose to preserve flexibility, only results in disagreements downstream about the licensee's obligations and makes it harder for a university to take advantage of the milestones. Another drawback of using milestones is that they can require the university to police the licensee to see if milestones are met. This may involve requiring submission of regular reports and developing a process for determining when the milestones have been met, so there is no question as to when the licensee has met or not met its obligations. 64 Utilizing certain milestones, particularly those based on pricing, may also require that a university have detailed Id.
63
64
knowledge of R&D, marketing, and profit potential, among other things.
65
Though we do not provide sample language for a university license here, some commentators have specified the types of milestones that could be used, including those requiring at-cost pricing models, elsewhere. 66 2. Non-exclusive licenses/Shorter periods of exclusivity
In addition to the approaches described above which involve nonexclusive licensing, some humanitarian licensing proposals have called for a movement toward utilizing non-exclusive licenses as the norm.
67 Others propose shortening the life of an exclusive license to less than the life of a patent, so that a company would have an exclusive license at first, but prior to the patent expiring, a university could license the technology to another company to ensure quicker coverage in underserved markets.
68
Utilizing non-exclusive licensing as the norm has a lot of benefits, in that it allows universities to make use of many of the approaches listed above. A university can give an exclusive license to one entity for high-income markets, and a license to other entities for low-to middle-income markets. 69 It could take advantage of market segmentation as a strategy and could also facilitate generic competition. However, the obvious drawback is that moving toward non-exclusive licenses may be difficult for university technology transfer offices, which often feel they have limited bargaining power in their licensing negotiations already. Additionally, trying to shorten the period of exclusivity can be difficult if licensing early stage research, as it can be hard to predict how long it will take a licensee to develop and market a product, and thus how long of an exclusive period to give the licensee.
70 Importantly, these agreements may not effectively allow generic manufacturers to make a drug/biologic if the university owns only some of the intellectual property needed to produce the drug/biologic. To use the example quoted above, if the university owns the patent to the key protein used in a vaccine, but another entity has patented the production process or other elements required to produce the vaccine, a non-exclusive license to the university intellectual property alone will not be effective.
At the same time, moving toward non-exclusive licenses protects universities from falling prey to aggressive licensing practices of industry partners, who often may try to obtain rights to all future innovations, or aggregate patents to dominate an industry. Additionally, the premise of this article is that universities, despite their perception of the distribution of power in licensing negotiations, need to take advantage of their upstream role in the process of drug development to ensure that university research is used in keeping with the university mission. Universities need to begin engaging in humanitarian licensing and asserting whatever power they have in licensing negotiations.
65
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Another approach to humanitarian licensing involves a university restricting the right of a licensee to patent future innovations developed from the licensed patent rights. 71 This approach would be effective in enhancing access, as a drug company would not be able to patent the drug it developed from the university research, and thus generic manufacturers would be able to produce the drug. However, this approach seems the most unlikely in practice when licensing with corporate industry partners. Pharmaceutical companies are not likely to pay for licensed patent rights if they cannot develop a patentable, profitable product from those rights. This option may be feasible for universities licensing to a non-profit drug company, or a foundation that is going to then sub-license the rights, or a public-private partnership seeking to develop a drug for neglected diseases or developing country contexts. Such licensing partners are not seeking to make a profit from the license, but rather are seeking to produce a drug for humanitarian purposes, and thus probably would not object to such a provision.
E. Comparison of Available Approaches
The following table summarizes the methods described in this Part. They are categorized by underlying strategy. As evidenced by this Part, none of the current approaches to humanitarian licensing is a one-size-fits-all approach. A comprehensive approach to humanitarian licensing that utilizes all available approaches and pairs them with the most appropriate technology is needed to truly capitalize on universities' upstream role in health product development and facilitate access in low-and middle-income countries. No university has yet embraced such a comprehensive approach, possibly because none has been suggested that takes into account the concerns of all stakeholders while allowing for flexibility in licensing negotiations. As such, we propose the Global Health Licensing Program.
Comparison of Available Approaches & Their Uses
III. THE GLOBAL HEALTH LICENSING PROGRAM
The best way to utilize university research for the greatest global health good is to institute a standing procedure for humanitarian licensing within university technology transfer offices. The goal of the Global Health Licensing Program is to utilize all available options at the university level to achieve the lowest possible price for, and enhance access to, health-related end productsincluding medicines, biologics, diagnostic tests, and medical devices -in lowand middle-income (LMI) countries. To achieve this, we propose an innovation-specific approach to humanitarian licensing rather than a onesize-fits-all approach. University technology transfer offices should create a standing procedure for licensing innovations to meet the essential medicines needs of LMI countries. This procedure should include a permanent committee of university community members housed within the technology transfer office and a toolbox of licensing language and standards that are crafted to appropriately meet global needs but tailored to the innovation to be licensed. The process should be transparent and consistent, while meeting the needs of the university, their industry partners, and the public interest.
Our proposal below is the culmination of our research and work with technology transfer offices and university stakeholders in our attempt to implement a comprehensive humanitarian licensing program at Georgetown University. It takes as its starting point the real-world technology transfer process and proposes a comprehensive program that could work within that process to expand access to health innovations developed with university research.
A. The Typical Licensing Process
Though every licensing process is different, the process usually begins when a researcher comes to the university technology transfer office (TTO) with some basic research. This ideally happens before publishing, in order to assess whether there are potential disclosure issues. At this point, the TTO identifies whether the research is patentable and assesses whether there is a reasonable commercial market. This is an appropriate time to start thinking about the merits of the research from a humanitarian stance. This is also the time when the researcher and TTO may begin talking about possible industry partners. The inventor is often already aware of the best partners for their type of research.
If there is clear market potential at this point, an outside patent attorney may be brought in to file a provisional or formal patent. After the filing, parties conduct further research into market possibilities, such as the size of the potential market and potential beneficiaries of the research. In a comprehensive Global Health Licensing Program, it is particularly important at this point to assess not just the potential in the developed world, but also the global need, and possibly look to alternative or non-profit funding sources.
If potential partners are identified, the parties may sign confidentiality agreements, and the inventor, TTO, and industry partner may begin to delve into scientific details. At this point, some sort of licensing process may begin, often bringing in the university's General Counsel, or an outside specialist if it is an exceptional situation. There are several types of licenses that may be signed, including an option to license, a license for research done, or research collaboration with an option to license the resulting intellectual property. The Sponsored Research Office (or similar office of the university) and TTO generally negotiate these licenses, and should do so in conjunction with the recommendations of the Global Health Licensing Committee.
B. The Global Health Licensing Committee
While TTOs work exceptionally hard to meet the financial and innovation goals of their university, they are often under-equipped to assess and address a scientific innovation's potential for use in LMI countries. However, there are many people in a typical university community that do have both the vested interest and the expertise to do this, and the Global Health Licensing Program seeks to harness these community skills in a standing committee.
The Global Health Licensing Committee would be a standing committee, hosted by the university's TTO, which would consist of technology transfer experts, researchers, patent attorneys, global health faculty members and clinicians, and perhaps business school professors and clergy. It may also be appropriate to include a rotating outside member on the Committee to bring an additional perspective. It is exceedingly important that there be at least one person on the Committee who substantively understands the realm of humanitarian licensing and the spectrum of related issues. This may be an external expert, a student, or faculty from the university's health, business, or law school.
72 Business and legal expertise on the Committee would permit flexibility if an innovation seems amenable to licensing to a small spin-off company with a more specific humanitarian mission.
The Committee would be charged with reviewing on a semi-annual basis all health-related innovations ready for licensing. When reviewing each innovation, the Committee must determine whether the expected resultant health product could have a significant positive impact on health in LMI countries. If so, the Committee must ensure that the license for the technology includes access-oriented language that goes beyond traditional, largely ineffective and unenforced, due diligence clauses. It would also be appropriate to have a contingency plan for an expedited process in the event that there is a race to patent an innovation. Having this predetermined process, whether it allows for an emergency meeting or a smaller Committee that can meet at little notice, would assure that every innovation, no matter how important, is reviewed for humanitarian licensing purposes and has access licensing attached if necessary. Without a preemptive licensing decision, there is little hope for even the most vital innovations to make it to LMI countries.
The Yale University Center for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS convened a discussion group on university research and access to essential In their report, they suggest a standard set of best practices that have reinforced our own observations regarding the needs of the university committee. 73 To be effective, any university engaging in humanitarian licensing must have a clear set of guiding principles, including a mission statement, to articulate what the TTO and Global Health Licensing Committee should be trying to achieve in every licensing negotiation. 74 The Yale group also reinforces the importance of: (1) transparency within the licensing process; (2) promoting education and awareness in the university community; and (3) universities monitoring their processes for effectiveness.
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It is very important, and often overlooked, that a Global Health Licensing Program must have a well-defined and accessible mission statement, against which the researchers and the Committee may measure all of their work. This also allows negotiation partners to have an expectation of what the university will be trying to achieve in its licenses, and has a normative function in supporting a national shift toward access-oriented university licensing. TTOs are often reticent to share too much, out of a fear that doing so will undermine their bargaining power. This can be avoided by having a general published mission statement that articulates the university and office commitment to research, the global good, and enhancing access. The office should also create a more specific set of access-oriented goals and objectives for humanitarian licensing that can be used internally.
While each university likely should craft its own mission statement, such a statement could draw on language from the proposed licensing preambles and policy statements excerpted below: 73 Kapczynski, supra note 70.
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Mission Statements: Sources of Potential Language
"WHEREAS, It is the policy of the University that its activities in licensing University intellectual property take into consideration Global Social Responsibility Objectives to fulfill unmet needs in Developing Countries, [such as those of neglected patient populations or geographic areas], and Licensee acknowledges and agrees to carry out its activities under this Agreement in a manner designed to fulfill such needs, as set forth below." "WHEREAS, University and Licensee understand and accept that it may serve the public good for there to be competitive sources of Licensed Product in certain markets, with appropriate safeguards to Licensee's economic interests in other markets as more fully specified herein, and that the result of this will be the availability of drugs at affordable prices to poor segments of the world's populations." We suggest that the Committee meet biannually. Reoccurring concerns in implementing new programs at universities are the time commitment inherent in committee work and the potential flourishing of correlated subcommittees. To maximize practicality, the Global Health Licensing Committee would be streamlined into an existing decision-making structure (such as a faculty review committee) and could meet infrequently with a clear mandate and short agenda. After the initial assessment of market potential for an innovation, and before licensing, health innovations would be sent by the TTO staff to the Committee with suggested access strategies. It would then be up to the Committee to assess and review the recommended language and strategies, with the program mission as the measuring stick. Importantly, however, the Committee must recognize that it has a separate mission from the TTO, in order to avoid becoming a "rubber stamp" for the TTO's recommendations. Drawing on university community members who already have a vested interest in humanitarian licensing (such as global health experts and researchers) will help prevent this from occurring.
We also recommend that the TTO and the Global Health Licensing Committee find ways to promote education throughout the University community. It has been our experience that researchers, professors, and students are woefully undereducated about the licensing process at universities, the need for access to essential medicines in the developing world, and the relationship between those two topics. Activities as simple as lunch meetings and information sessions can increase community awareness and involvement, give researchers more interest and agency in the licensing process, and raise the profile of the TTO on campus.
C. The Toolbox
The toolbox is the second component of the Global Health Licensing Program and is a set of standards and sample licensing clauses that should be considered for application to different technologies up for licensing. The TTO and Committee's responsibility is to apply a common set of assessments and definitions to each innovation, while identifying the licensing terms that best facilitate the university's humanitarian licensing goals.
The ideal toolbox should include examples of existing access licensing language and strategies (see Part II). It should also include suggestions for which licensing strategies work best with which technologies and in which situations. This will give the Committee a set of tangible examples to choose from or modify instead of having to recreate the wheel with each innovation. Additionally, the examples in the toolbox should be updated regularly to add any emerging approaches to university licensing, and to assess the usefulness of the existing language.
Another important part of creating standards is deciding upon and using a uniform set of definitions in licensing. Addressing definitions is a key aspect of managing intellectual property to increase access, and it promotes consistency between licenses. Some definitions that should be addressed within the toolbox include: (1) definition of geographic territory for marketing the product -both developed and developing markets; (2) claim for product exclusivity by the private sector licensee; and (3) definition of preferred public sector price or other public sector benefit. 76 Additionally, it may be particularly useful to universities to identify definitions that are commonly applied by industry.
The world of public-private partnerships gives us some lessons in developing standards via language that various public-private partnerships have deemed important for access-oriented licensing. Because public-private partnerships recognize that there is no single business model, they employ a common toolbox to manage intellectual property for global health outcomes. This toolbox includes defining a discrete territorial market, establishing distinct structures for public sector and private sector markets, determining field of use in a strategic manner, establishing royalty rates to optimize incentives, and providing for access to the developed technology in the event that the research/industry partner abandons the project.
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These are examples of the sorts of common standards that every toolbox should include. A toolbox such as this will allow the TTO to succeed in getting the most out of negotiations and will promote flexibility, while maintaining a baseline of standards and expectations for every license with LMI potential.
D. Rationale
As noted above, our proposed program attempts to provide a humanitarian licensing strategy that reflects the real-world experience of university licensing negotiations. It also attempts to address the concerns of multiple stakeholders while simultaneously maximizing efficacy.
Some may critique our program because it does not require generic competition -rather, it allows universities to select the most appropriate humanitarian licensing mechanism for each innovation being licensed. As such, mechanisms that facilitate generic competition are elements of the program and part of the toolbox of licensing options, but they are not the only mechanisms a university can use under our program. Some access advocates will say that this allows universities too much leeway and flexibility, because many feel that only generic competition will effectively lower prices and enhance access for patients in poor countries.
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While generic competition is a highly effective way to bring down drug prices in LMI countries and has been crucial to such efforts in the past, we feel strongly, after extensive research and interviews with university stakeholders and patent experts, that our approach is more reflective of the reality of university licensing negotiations and the upstream power that universities actually have. Simply put, universities will not embrace a one- See Kapczynski, supra note 3, at 1048-49 ("MSF has concluded that 'the most significant factor in lowering prices is the introduction of generic sources in a country,' and Oxfam International has called generic competition the single most important tool to remedy the access gap"); KEI Submission, supra note 3, at 2-3; Chaifetz et al., supra note 3, at 2; Oxfam International, Save the Children, and VSO, Beyond Philanthropy: The Pharmaceutical Industry, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Developing World, 15 (2002). size-fits-all approach because each health innovation, licensing negotiation, and resultant technology transfer agreement is different. Each health innovation has different market potential, different potential to improve health in LMI countries, and different interested industry partners. Each negotiation has different power structures and parties at the table, and each university is in a different position of bargaining power, based on their research capacity and level of dealings with industry partners. Finally, generic production is not a panacea and has questionable current applicability to biologics and devices.
Supporting our position, recent publications by experienced technology transfer experts suggesting strategies by which universities can engage in humanitarian licensing reflect a similar approach to our program -one in which universities experiment with available options. 79 Additionally, even advocacy organizations that have traditionally been wedded to the notion of generic competition are recognizing that mechanisms for facilitating such competition should be used "whenever possible" but that, where they are not appropriate, "other robust access provisions" should be used.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, any university-based humanitarian licensing effort must be comprehensive and utilize all available approaches to maximize effectiveness. In order to draft licenses that will have real impact in enhancing access to medicines in LMI countries, universities need to devise a consistent process and standing program dedicated to humanitarian licensing. Taking action proactively and creating a standing program, rather than attempting to renegotiate terms when a licensed innovation has been distributed inappropriately, will ensure that universities marshal their upstream role in drug and health product development to maximize the social good. It allows universities to lead, rather than be forced by negative publicity to take action after the fact. This program reflects a new approach to access-oriented licensing -one that acknowledges the challenges facing university TTOs, takes into account the real world licensing process, utilizes all existing strategies, and effectively increases access to essential medicines for the world's poor.
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